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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific 
progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing 
the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of 
scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., 
scientific progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific 
progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific 
progress in terms of understanding). Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study 
lend some empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the semantic account 
of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and 
‘understanding’ significantly more often than the term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims or 
goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic 
account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between 
the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ 
when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Chang (2007, p. 1), “Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues 
in the philosophy of science today.” Following the publication of Bird’s (2007) seminal paper on 
scientific progress, an exchange ensued between Bird (2008), Rowbottom (2008), (2015), and 
Niiniluoto (2014) on the merits of various philosophical accounts of scientific progress. Bird 
(2007) defends an epistemic account of scientific progress, according to which scientific 
progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge. Bird (2008) characterizes the epistemic 
account as follows: 
 
(E) An episode constitutes scientific progress precisely when it shows the accumulation 
of scientific knowledge (Bird 2008, p. 279). 
 
Against (E), Rowbottom (2008) defends a semantic account, according to which scientific 
progress should be understood in terms of truth, not knowledge. Bird (2008) characterizes the 
semantic account as follows: 
 
(S) An episode constitutes scientific progress precisely when it either (a) shows the 
accumulation of true scientific belief, or (b) shows increasing approximation to true 
scientific belief (Bird 2008, p. 279). 
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In another paper on scientific progress, Rowbottom (2010, p. 245) endorses (S) explicitly when 
he writes: 
 
I wish to emphasise that the semantic view of scientific progress, which Bird (2007) 
correctly takes me to prefer as an alternative to the epistemic view, only requires that 
science makes progress by discovering new truths. Such truths could take the form of ‘T1 
is approximately empirically adequate in the class of circumstances C’, or even ‘T2 is 
false’, and so on (emphasis added). 
 
Niiniluoto (2014) criticizes Rowbottom’s arguments for (S) over (E), but he also defines 
scientific progress in semantic terms. Specifically, he argues that “scientific progress can be 
defined by increasing verisimilitude” (Niiniluoto 2014, p. 77). For Niiniluoto (2014, p. 75), 
“Historical case studies, which illustrate progress as increasing truthlikeness include shifts from 
Ptolemy to Snell’s law of refraction,” among others. Rowbottom (2015) has responded to 
Niiniluoto (2014) and the debate rages on.1 
 
Against (E) and (S), Dellsén (2016) argues for an understanding-based account of 
scientific progress. According to the “noetic account” of scientific progress, science “makes 
cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world” 
(Dellsén 2018a, p. 451). As Dellsén (2018b) explains, “Unlike Bird’s epistemic account, [the 
noetic account] does not require that scientists have justification for, or even belief in, the 
explanations or predictions they propose.” By contrast, Mizrahi and Buckwalter (2014) conduct 
an empirical study of intuitive judgments about scientific progress and find that they are sensitive 
to (internal) justification. Moreover, Park (2017) criticizes the noetic account and argues in favor 
of an epistemic or knowledge-based account, along the lines of (E). Dellsén (2018a) responds to 
Park (2017), Park (2019) responds to Dellsén, and the debate rages on. 
 
In that respect, the philosophical debate over scientific progress is not about whether 
science makes progress. Rather, the debate is about the nature of scientific progress. That is, 
“How should we understand scientific progress?” (Douglas 2014, p. 55). What constitutes 
progress in science? Does scientific progress consist in approximation to truth? Does scientific 
progress consist in accumulation of knowledge? Does scientific progress consist in increasing 
understanding? To borrow a phrase from Laudan (1977, p. 66), the debate is over “the basic unit 
of scientific progress.” On the semantic account, the basic unit of scientific progress is truth. On 
the epistemic account, the basic unit of scientific progress is knowledge. On the noetic account, 
the basic unit of scientific progress is understanding.2 
 
1 More recently, however, Rowbottom (2019, p. 19) has argued that scientific progress should not be defined solely 
in terms of increasing verisimilitude, but rather that “scientific progress more centrally involves increasing our 
resources for predicting and understanding how phenomena interrelate” (emphasis in original). In that respect, 
Rowbottom (2019, p. 22) agrees with Mizrahi (2013a) that increasing know how “is another significant means by 
which science can progress.” For another argument against the semantic account of scientific progress, see Mizrahi 
(2017). 
2 Another philosophical account that should be mentioned here is the “functional-internalist” account of scientific 
progress, according to which “An episode shows scientific progress precisely when it achieves a specific goal of 
science, where that goal is such that its achievement can be determined by scientists at that time (e.g., solving 
scientific puzzles)” (Bird 2008, p. 279). Kuhn’s account of scientific progress is a functional-internalist account of 
scientific progress, where “the solved problem is the basic unit of scientific progress” and “the aim of science is to 
maximize the scope of solved empirical problems” (Laudan 1977, p. 66). However, the current debate over scientific 
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The aim of this paper is to contribute to this ongoing debate over the nature of scientific 
progress by taking an empirical approach. It reports the results of a quantitative, corpus-based 
study of the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of progress. For, as van Fraassen (1994, p. 
184) argues, “Any philosophical view of science is to be held accountable to actual scientific 
practice, scientific activity.” If van Fraassen is right about this, then philosophical views of 
scientific progress can (and perhaps should) be held accountable to actual scientific practice, or 
scientific activity, as well. Philosophical accounts of scientific progress can be tested empirically 
against scientific practice by using the methods of data science and corpus linguistics. These 
methods allow for the systematic study of a large corpus of scientific texts in order to uncover 
patterns of usage. In particular, do practicing scientists talk about scientific progress in their 
published work? If so, in what terms? Do they talk about scientific progress in terms of truth, in 
terms of knowledge, or in terms of understanding? Finding answers to these questions 
empirically might help to shed new light on the nature of scientific progress by revealing how 
practicing scientists conceive of scientific progress. In this way, philosophical accounts of 
scientific progress can be held accountable to scientific practice, or scientific activity, just as van 
Fraassen recommends. 
 
Furthermore, this empirical testing of philosophical accounts of scientific progress 
against scientific practice should be of particular interest to philosophers of science who 
advocate for “a conscious and organized programme of detailed and systematic study of 
scientific practice that does not dispense with concerns about truth and rationality” (Society for 
Philosophy of Science in Practice 2006-2019). To the extent that there has been a “practice turn” 
in philosophy of science, as some claim (Soler et al. 2014), empirical methods should be 
particularly useful to philosophers of science who are interested in studying scientific practices. 
According to the mission statement of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP), 
“Practice consists of organized or regulated activities aimed at the achievement of certain goals” 
(Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice 2006-2019). Empirical methods, such as those 
used in this empirical study, namely, the text mining, corpus analysis, and data visualization 
techniques of data science and corpus linguistics, seem to be well suited for studying “actual 
scientific practice, scientific activity” (van Fraassen 1994, p. 184). 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 consists of a description of the 
methods used in this quantitative, corpus-based study of conceptions of scientific progress in 
scientific practice. The results of this study are reported in Section 3. Section 4 contains a 
discussion of the implications of the results of this study as far as the philosophical debate 
concerning the nature of scientific progress is concerned. Overall, the results of this quantitative, 
corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the 
semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘understanding’ significantly more often than the term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims 
or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic 
account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between 
the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ 
when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. 
 
progress in contemporary philosophy of science has been focused on the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts. 
Although see Shan (2019) for a recent defense of a functional account of scientific progress. 
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2. Methods 
 
This quantitative, corpus-based study is designed to test the semantic account (i.e., scientific 
progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), 
and the noetic account (i.e., scientific progress in terms of understanding) of scientific progress 
empirically. For, on the assumption that we can learn from scientific practices, specifically, from 
what scientists say and do in their published works, each of these philosophical accounts of 
scientific progress has empirical consequences that can be tested against “actual scientific 
practice, scientific activity” (van Fraassen 1994, p. 184). More specifically: 
 
● On the semantic account, which defines scientific progress in terms of truth, we would 
expect to find that practicing scientists talk about scientific progress in terms of truth 
more than knowledge or understanding in scientific publications. 
● On the epistemic account, which defines scientific progress in terms of knowledge, we 
would expect to find that practicing scientists talk about scientific progress in terms of 
knowledge more than truth or understanding in scientific publications. 
● On the noetic account, which defines scientific progress in terms of understanding, we 
would expect to find that practicing scientists talk about scientific progress in terms of 
understanding more than knowledge or truth in scientific publications. 
 
It is important to emphasize, as an anonymous reviewer encouraged me to do, that these are 
empirical, not logically necessary, consequences of the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts 
of scientific progress. That is to say, proponents of each of these accounts of scientific progress 
are not necessarily committed to these empirical consequences because they could always reject 
the methodological assumptions that are used to derive these empirical consequences in the first 
place. In particular, it is open to proponents of any account of scientific progress to reject the 
methodological assumption that what scientists say and do in their published works can (and/or 
should) inform philosophical accounts of scientific progress. For example, proponents of the 
semantic account of scientific progress, which construes scientific progress in terms of truth, are 
not necessarily committed to the empirical claim that practicing scientists use the term ‘truth’ 
more than other terms for the basic units of progress, such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’, 
when they talk about the aims and/or goals of scientific research in their published works unless 
they accept the methodological assumption that philosophical accounts of scientific progress are 
to be tested against what practicing scientists say and do in their published works. Proponents of 
the semantic account, or any other account of scientific progress for that matter, might reject this 
methodological assumption for metaphilosophical reasons if, say, they prefer testing 
philosophical accounts of scientific progress against intuitions, as Bird (2007) does,3 or case 
studies from the history of science, as Niiniluoto (2014) does. Or they might insist that the 
philosophical debate over the nature of scientific progress is a purely normative debate, with no 
descriptive dimensions whatsoever, and thus empirical evidence cannot settle any questions 
concerning the nature of scientific progress. As Niiniluoto (2019) puts it: 
 
it can be argued […] that progress should not be defined by the actual developments of 
science: the definition of progress should give us a normative standard for appraising the 
 
3 Cf. Cevolani and Tambolo (2013) whose intuitions seem to differ from Bird’s. 
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choices that the scientific communities have made, could have made, are just now 
making, and will make in the future. The task of finding and defending such standards is 
a genuinely philosophical one which can be enlightened by history and sociology but 
which cannot be reduced to empirical studies of science (emphasis in original). 
 
In this paper, I will try to steer clear of this metaphilosophical debate over how to do philosophy 
of science, if I can. For I am not arguing that testing philosophical accounts of scientific progress 
against actual scientific practices empirically is better than testing them against intuitions or case 
studies from the history of science. Rather, I am simply proposing such empirical testing of 
philosophical accounts of scientific progress as an alternative (neither better nor worse) to 
testing them against intuitions or case studies. 
 
Now, assuming that we do want to test philosophical accounts of scientific progress 
against scientific practices empirically, since we think that the results of such empirical studies 
might help to shed new light on the nature of scientific progress, the methods of text mining and 
corpus analysis allow us to examine a large corpus of scientific texts (i.e., articles and book 
chapters written by practicing scientists and published in scientific journals and books) in order 
to find out how practicing scientists conceive of progress in scientific practice (i.e., in their 
published work). Such data can be mined from JSTOR Data for Research (www.jstor.org/dfr/). 
Researchers can use JSTOR DfR to create datasets, including metadata, n-grams, and word 
counts, for most of the articles and book chapters contained in the JSTOR database. Accordingly, 
we can mine the JSTOR database for instances of the terms ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and 
‘understanding’ in order to see whether, and to what extent, practicing scientists use these terms 
when they talk about scientific progress in their published works. If the semantic account of 
scientific progress is true, we should find that practicing scientists use the term ‘truth’ more 
frequently than the terms ‘knowledge’ or ‘understanding’ when they discuss scientific progress 
in scientific publications. If the epistemic account of scientific progress is true, we should find 
that practicing scientists use the term ‘knowledge’ more frequently than the terms ‘truth’ or 
‘understanding’ when they discuss scientific progress in scientific publications. And if the noetic 
account of scientific progress is true, we should find that practicing scientists use the term 
‘understanding’ more frequently than the terms ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ when they discuss 
scientific progress in scientific publications. Again, these are empirical, not logically necessary, 
consequences of the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress that can be 
derived from these accounts only by assuming that there is a descriptive dimension to the 
question of scientific progress that can be investigated empirically. This is not to say that the 
question of scientific progress can be settled empirically. Instead, it is merely to say that we 
might be able to gain some insights from an empirical investigation of the ways in which 
practicing scientists talk about scientific progress. 
 
The methods of text mining and corpus analysis allow us to overcome the limitations of 
relying on selected case studies from the history of science. For those case studies may or may 
not be representative of science as a whole. As Pitt (2001, p. 373) puts it, “if one starts with a 
case study, it is not clear where to go from there—for it is unreasonable to generalize from one 
case or even two or three.” After all, examples of practicing scientists talking about scientific 
progress in terms of truth, knowledge, and understanding can be found in scientific publications 
rather easily. For example (emphasis added): 
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Progress in vegetation science can be found neither in generating untestable hypotheses 
about vegetation as such nor in more and more detailed descriptions of local vegetation 
types. [...] The definition of progress depends on the definition of truth (Wiegleb 1989, p. 
27). 
 
In this case, progress in vegetation science is discussed in terms of truth.4 One might worry, 
however, whether this example is representative of science as a whole.5 By using the text mining, 
corpus analysis, and data visualization techniques of data science and corpus linguistics, we can 
study a large corpus of scientific texts in order to uncover patterns of usage. Those patterns of 
usage, in turn, might shed some light on the ways in which practicing scientists conceive of 
scientific progress in scientific practice (i.e., in scientific research published in scientific 
journals).6 
 
Of course, empirical methodologies have limitations of their own. As far as the corpus-
based methods used in this quantitative study are concerned, there are two major limitations. 
First, we can only study and analyze what is explicitly mentioned in the corpus. For the purpose 
of this corpus-based study, then, the corpus of scientific texts must contain explicit mentions of 
the terms ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’, for us to be able to analyze patterns of 
usage. As mentioned above, examples of practicing scientists talking about scientific progress in 
terms of truth, knowledge, and understanding in scientific publications are not difficult to find, 
but we would like to know how frequently practicing scientists use these terms, and whether 
there are significant differences in the frequency with which these terms are used by practicing 
scientists. 
 
In that respect, it is important to acknowledge the possibility that practicing scientists 
could be using the terms ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’ in ways that differ from the 
ways in which philosophers are using these terms. For example, it is possible that practicing 
scientists use the term ‘knowledge’ to mean something like “true belief” rather than “justified 
true belief.” Relatedly, it is also worth noting that the notions of truth, knowledge, and 
understanding are often taken as givens and remain unanalyzed in philosophical accounts of 
scientific progress. For example, according to Bird (2007), who defends the epistemic account of 
scientific progress, knowledge does not mean “justified true belief.” Rather, Bird (2007, p. 87) 
takes his argument for the epistemic account of scientific progress “to support Williamson’s 
view (Williamson 2000) that knowledge is the central epistemic concept and does not have an 
analysis.” Likewise, some proponents of the semantic account of scientific progress tend to leave 
the notion of truth unanalyzed, while others take it that truth is correspondence to reality (or to 
facts). For example, on Niiniluoto’s (2014, p. 74) similarity approach, truthlikeness is explicated 
“as distance from the target C* which is the most informative true statement in [a semantically 
 
4 Cf. Mizrahi (2013a), where two case studies (namely, Landsteiner’s discovery of blood groups and Pavlov’s work 
on the physiology of digestion) are taken as providing support for an epistemic account of scientific progress. 
5 On the methodological problems associated with using case studies from the history of science as evidence in 
philosophy of science, see Sauer and Scholl (2016, pp. 1-10), Bolinska and Martin (2020), and Mizrahi (2020). 
6 On the application of the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, such as data mining and corpus analysis, 
to philosophy of science, see Mizrahi (2013b) and Mizrahi (2016). For an example of an application of survey and 
other methodologies from the social sciences to the question of scientific progress in philosophy of science, see 
Mizrahi and Buckwalter (2014). See also Beebe and Dellsén (2020). 
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determinate language] L” (emphasis added). Like Bird (2007), who does not offer an analysis of 
the notion of knowledge, Niiniluoto (2014) does not offer an analysis of what makes C* true. 
Rather, C* is the target from which a theory’s degree of truthlikeness is determined as a measure 
of distance. That is, “The degree of truthlikeness Tr(H,C*) is […] 1 minus the distance between 
H and C*” (Niiniluoto 2014, p. 74). For Cevolani and Tambolo (2013, p. 928), who defend a 
semantic account of scientific progress in terms of increasing verisimilitude, there is a 
“distinction between real and estimated progress,” which “is motivated by the fact that there is 
no way to ascertain whether a given belief exhibits a genuine correspondence to ‘the real 
world’” (emphasis added), where “truth is defined as correspondence between interpreted 
sentences in a language L and facts” (Tambolo 2014, p. 208). Finally, Dellsén (2018, p. 7) admits 
that “the concept of ‘understanding’ is itself a hotly debated topic, so there is little agreement on 
what is required for someone to possess understanding.” For this reason, Dellsén (2016, p. 75) 
stipulates that, on his noetic account of scientific progress, scientific understanding means 
grasping “how to correctly explain and/or predict some aspects of the target in the right sort of 
circumstances.” To Dellsén (2016, p. 75), this “seems […] to be a very natural way to conceive 
of the kind of understanding that is of relevance to the sciences.” But it is by no means generally 
accepted among epistemologists, as Dellsén (2018, p. 7) knows well. The point here is not meant 
to be a criticism against the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress. 
Surely, when giving a philosophical account of some phenomenon, one has to start somewhere, 
and so some notions are bound to be taken for granted, stipulated, or remain unanalyzed. Rather, 
the point is that the terms ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’ could be used in different 
ways. For example, suppose that practicing scientists use the term ‘knowledge’ to mean 
something like “true belief” (without justification). Suppose further that we find practicing 
scientists using the term ‘knowledge’ significantly more often than the terms ‘truth’ or 
‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims and goals of scientific research in their published 
works. In that case, proponents of the semantic account of scientific progress could argue that the 
prevalence of “knowledge” talk actually supports the semantic account of scientific progress 
because, for scientists, “knowledge” means “true belief.”7 This is why the results of this 
empirical study, like the results of any other empirical study, should not to be interpreted as 
conclusive evidence for or against any philosophical account of scientific progress. 
 
Second, as with many empirical methodologies, there may be some false positives and/or 
false negatives. As far as the text-mining method employed in this corpus-based study is 
concerned, false positives would be instances of the terms ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, or 
‘understanding’ in scientific publications that are not about progress in science. Take, for 
example, the following occurrence of ‘truth’ in a scientific text (emphasis added): 
 
Certainly, we all dream of a one-gene-determining-one-phenotype scenario, but this 
actually might be far from the truth in biological systems (Heng and Cao 2006, p. 52). 
 
In this case, the term ‘truth’ is used but not in the context of talk about scientific progress per se. 
Therefore, we would like our text-mining methodology to ignore such instances of the terms 
‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’ that are not about scientific progress per se. We can do 
so by refining our text-mining methodology. Here is how. 
 
 
7 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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As Niiniluoto (2019) points out, the philosophical debate over the nature of scientific 
progress is “concerned with axiological questions about the aims and goals of science” 
(emphasis added). This is because “Progress is a goal-relative concept” (Niiniluoto 2019; 
emphasis in original). On the semantic account of scientific progress, the aim or goal of science 
is to get closer to the truth. On the epistemic account of scientific progress, the aim or goal of 
science is to accumulate knowledge. On the noetic account of scientific progress, the aim or goal 
of science is to increase understanding. Accordingly, to make sure that instances of the terms 
‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’ in scientific publications are about scientific progress, 
and thereby minimize the number of false positives our text-mining methodology might identify, 
we can search for the terms for the basic units of progress ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and 
‘understanding’ in the context of the progress terms ‘aim’ and ‘goal’. When we combine the 
terms for the basic units of progress, namely, ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’, with the 
progress terms, namely, ‘aim’ and ‘goal’, we get the search pairs listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Search pairs for the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress 
 
 aim goal 
Truth aim truth goal truth 
knowledge aim knowledge goal knowledge 
understanding aim understanding goal understanding 
 
By pairing the terms for the basic units of progress with the progress terms, as listed in Table 1, 
we can be quite confident that our text-mining method would pick out instances of the terms for 
the basic units of progress in the corpus that occur in the context of talk about the aims or goals 
of scientific research. “In the context of” is operationalized using the operator ~ and the number 
of words between the terms for the basic units of progress and the progress terms. For the 
purposes of this corpus-based study, the number of words between the terms for the basic units 
of progress and the progress terms is ten. This is because, according to the Concise Oxford 
Companion to the English Language, “written English sentences might average 20 words in 
length” and many English sentences are complex sentences, i.e., they consist of two main clauses 
joined by a coordinating conjunction. Accordingly, we can be quite confident that instances of 
the terms for the basic units of progress occur in the context of talk about the aims or goals of 
scientific research if those terms occur in the same clause. Since an average English sentence is 
twenty words long, consisting of two main clauses, we should allow for no more than ten words 
between a term for the basic units of progress and a progress term.8 In practice, this means that 
we search for each of the terms for the basic units of progress within ten words of each of the 
progress terms, e.g., (“aim truth”~10), (“goal knowledge”~10), (“aim understanding”~10), and 
so on. This text-mining methodology is designed to minimize the number of false positives, i.e., 
instances of the terms for the basic units of progress that are not about scientific progress, by 
ensuring that instances of these terms in text are anchored to the progress terms, namely, ‘aim’ or 
 
8 In that respect, the default setting for proximity searches in databases like JSTOR and ProQuest’s Literature Online 
(LION) is ten words. 
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‘goal’, while allowing for only ten words between a term for a basic unit of progress, such as 
‘truth’, and a progress term, such as ‘goal’. 
 
Moreover, this text-mining methodology is also designed to minimize the number of false 
negatives. As far as the text-mining method employed in this corpus-based study is concerned, 
false negatives could occur when we search for a specific term t in a corpus, but do not find it, 
even though the corpus contains a synonym of t. For example, although unlikely, it is possible 
that our corpus of scientific texts contains no instances of ‘aim’, and so a search for ‘aim’ would 
return zero results, because practicing scientists use a synonym for ‘aim’, such as ‘goal’, when 
they talk about scientific progress in all the publications that make up our corpus. By pairing the 
terms for the basic units of progress with the progress terms ‘aim’ and ‘goal’, as listed in Table 1, 
we can be quite confident that our text-mining method would pick out instances of the terms for 
the basic units of progress in the corpus that occur in the context of talk about the aims or goals 
of scientific research, and thereby minimize the number of false negatives in our datasets. 
 
For example, this text-mining methodology will identify the following as a positive result 
for the basic unit of progress ‘truth’ in the context of talk about scientific goals (emphasis 
added): 
 
If scientists are unwilling to make this small extra step, it must be questioned whether 
they are genuinely interested in uncovering the truth—the ultimate goal of science—or 
whether they are pursuing their own agenda (Vink et al. 2012, p. 452). 
 
This is precisely what we would like our text-mining method to do in this case because truth is 
singled out here as the ultimate goal of science. So this is a genuine instance of ‘truth’ being used 
as a basic unit of progress in scientific practice and our text-mining methodology will count it as 
a positive result of (“goal truth”~10) because there are less than ten words between the term for 
the basic unit of progress ‘truth’ and the progress term ‘goal’. On the other hand, the following 
instance of ‘truth’ will not be counted as a positive result of (“aim truth”~10) by our text-mining 
method because there are more than ten words between the term for the basic unit of progress 
‘truth’ and the progress term ‘aim’ (emphasis added): 
 
If the basic aim is to estimate the mean value of a biological variable over a study area, 
the simple random sampling design, one of the simplest probabilistic designs, gives the 
results closest to truth (Albert et al. 2010, p. 1034). 
 
This is precisely what we would like our text-mining method to do in this case as well because 
the term ‘aim’ is used to talk about estimating means, not about making progress in science. Note 
that the sentence in the quotation above is a complex sentence where the term for the basic unit 
of progress ‘truth’ and the progress term ‘aim’ do not occur in the same clause. 
 
In that respect, it is worth noting that, although they are synonyms for the progress terms 
‘aim’ and ‘goal’, the terms ‘objective’ and ‘end’ are too problematic to use as practice terms to 
search for in this quantitative, corpus-based study. For the terms ‘objective’ and ‘end’ have many 
more meanings besides being synonymous with ‘aim’ and ‘goal’. As philosophers know all too 
well, the term ‘objective’ is particularly problematic. Janack (2002, p. 275) identifies no less than 
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thirteen distinct uses of “objectivity.” The same can be said about ‘end’, which can be used to 
talk about the end-result of an activity, but also the final part of a period of time or the 
conclusion of a story. 
 
It is also important to note that, just like any other empirical study, the results of this 
quantitative, corpus-based study are not to be interpreted as conclusive evidence for or against 
any philosophical account of scientific progress. Nor are the methods used in this study the only 
(or even the best) methods to study how practicing scientists conceive of scientific progress in 
scientific practice. Rather, the methods and results of this study are supposed to help shed new 
light on the question of scientific progress in philosophy of science. Other studies, which make 
use of different empirical methods, such as survey procedures, can do the same (see, e.g., 
Mizrahi and Buckwalter 2014, and Beebe and Dellsén 2020). 
 
3. Results 
 
The JSTOR database allows for searches by subject, such as Biological Sciences, Physics, and 
Sociology. In order to have a large and diverse sample that would be representative of science as 
a whole, searches were conducted on data mined from the following subjects in the JSTOR 
database: Anthropology, Archeology, Astronomy, Biological Sciences, Economics, Geography, 
Geology, Linguistics, Mathematics, Paleontology, Physics, Psychology, Sociology, Statistics, 
and Zoology. That way, the datasets for this study contain representative disciplines from the life 
sciences (namely, Biological Sciences and Zoology), the physical sciences (namely, Astronomy 
and Physics), the social sciences (namely, Anthropology and Sociology), and the formal sciences 
(namely, Mathematics and Statistics). 
 
For each of the aforementioned subjects, searches were conducted for the terms for the 
basic units of progress ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’ in the context of (i.e., within ten 
words of) the progress terms ‘aim’ and ‘goal’ (see Table 1). The search results for the terms for 
the basic units of progress in the context of (i.e., within ten words of) the progress term ‘aim’ in 
each subject are listed in Table 2. All searches were conducted on February 21, 2020 and results 
were verified on June 8, 2020. 
 
Table 2. Total number of publications, and those that contain the terms for the basic units of 
progress in the context of talk about scientific aims, by subject (Source: JSTOR Data for 
Research) 
 
 Total 
“aim 
truth”~10 
“aim 
knowledge”~10 
“aim 
understanding”~10 
Anthropology 341313 160 689 588 
Archaeology 327238 42 219 377 
Astronomy 18427 3 4 7 
Biological 
Sciences 1331986 149 1100 1470 
Economics 730341 111 650 675 
11 
Geography 175314 31 289 240 
Geology 15556 1 12 9 
Linguistics 204098 85 239 202 
Mathematics 367900 82 306 424 
Paleontology 35403 2 14 21 
Physics 5834 4 5 14 
Psychology 97110 90 293 342 
Sociology 724387 413 1587 1523 
Statistics 135538 19 129 150 
Zoology 257911 7 118 115 
 
Since some subjects in the JSTOR database contain more publications than others, we need to 
compare proportions rather than raw counts. The proportions of the terms for the basic units of 
progress in the context of (i.e., within ten words of) the progress term ‘aim’ in each subject are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Proportions of publications that contain the terms for the basic units of progress in the 
context of talk about scientific aims by subject (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
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As we can see from Figure 1, the terms for the basic units of progress do not occur all that 
frequently in the context of talk about aims in scientific publications (less than 0.4% overall). To 
the extent that they do occur, however, it is ‘understanding’ that occurs most frequently overall, 
followed by ‘knowledge’, and then ‘truth’. The exceptions are Anthropology, Geography, 
Geology, Linguistics, Sociology, and Zoology, in which ‘knowledge’ occurs more frequently 
than ‘understanding’ in the context of aim talk. 
 
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the proportions of scientific 
publications that contain the terms for the basic units of progress in the context of (i.e., within ten 
words of) the progress term ‘aim’ across the subjects tested in this study. First, there was a 
significant difference between the proportion of (“aim knowledge”~10) publications (M = 0.001, 
SD = 0.0007, N = 15) and (“aim truth”~10) publications (M = 0.0002, SD = 0.0002, N = 15), 
t(17) = -4.002, p < 0.00, two-tailed. Second, there was a significant difference between the 
proportion of (“aim understanding”~10) publications (M = 0.001, SD = 0.0008, N = 15) and 
(“aim truth”~10) publications (M = 0.0002, SD = 0.0002, N = 15), t(16) = -3.41, p < 0.00, two-
tailed. Finally, there was no significant difference between the proportion of (“aim 
knowledge”~10) publications (M = 0.0011, SD = 0.0007, N = 15) and (“aim understanding”~10) 
publications (M = 0.0013, SD = 0.0008, N = 15), t(28) = -0.59, p < 0.55, two-tailed. These 
results suggest that there is significantly more talk about the aim of scientific research in terms of 
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knowledge than in terms of truth, and there is also significantly more talk about the aim of 
scientific research in terms of understanding than in terms of truth, but there isn’t significantly 
more talk about the aim of scientific research in terms of understanding than in terms of 
knowledge. 
 
In order to make sure that the text-mining methodology described in Section 2 returns 
genuine instances of the terms for the basic units of progress in the context of talk about the aims 
of scientific research, one result from the life sciences, one result from the physical sciences, one 
result from the social sciences, and one result from the formal sciences were selected at random 
(emphasis added): 
 
1. Life Sciences: “The aims of our research are therefore twofold: firstly, to increase our 
understanding of migratory population dynamics in declining populations of 
shorebirds...” (Dhanjal-Adams 2019, p. 798). 
2. Physical Sciences: “We studied their scaling relations with the aim of understanding the 
role of SMBHs in the evolution of galaxies” (Beifiori 2011, p. 514). 
3. Social Sciences: “The aim of the present research is to contribute to the knowledge of the 
complex processes of migration and social mobility and their mutual interconnections in 
general…” (Guhlich 2017, p. 324). 
4. Formal Sciences: “there is a ground truth that statisticians can aim to discover” (Bogdan 
et al. 2015, p. 1104). 
 
In each of these examples, practicing scientists talk about the aims of their research in terms of 
understanding, knowledge, or truth. Statistically speaking, however, there is no significant 
difference between talk of the aim of scientific research in terms of increasing understanding 
than talk of the aim of scientific research in terms of advancing knowledge. Both talk of the aim 
of scientific research in terms of knowledge and talk of the aim of scientific research in terms of 
understanding, however, are significantly more frequent than talk of the aim of scientific 
research in terms of truth. 
 
When we search for the terms for the basic units of progress in the context of talk about 
the goals of scientific research, we find somewhat similar results. The search results for the terms 
for the basic units of progress in the context of (i.e., within ten words of) the progress term ‘goal’ 
in each subject are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Total number of publications, and those that contain the terms for the basic units of 
progress in the context of talk about scientific goals, by subject (Source: JSTOR Data for 
Research) 
 
 Total 
“goal 
truth”~10 
“goal 
knowledge”~10 
“goal 
understanding”~10 
Anthropology 341313 158 718 847 
Archaeology 327238 32 167 362 
Astronomy 18427 3 11 34 
14 
Biological Sciences 1331986 129 1243 2286 
Economics 730341 121 609 709 
Geography 175314 22 144 174 
Geology 15556 5 7 12 
Linguistics 204098 68 328 291 
Mathematics 367900 75 360 552 
Paleontology 35403 3 18 50 
Physics 5834 10 17 27 
Psychology 97110 88 708 781 
Sociology 724387 559 2045 2054 
Statistics 135538 21 132 155 
Zoology 257911 14 130 227 
 
Again, since some subjects in the JSTOR database contain more publications than others, we 
need to compare proportions rather than raw counts. The proportions of the terms for the basic 
units of progress in the context of (i.e., within ten words of) the progress term ‘goal’ in each 
subject are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Proportions of publications that contain the terms for the basic units of progress in the 
context of talk about scientific goals by subject (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
 
15 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 2, the terms for the basic units of progress do not occur all that 
frequently in the context of talk about goals in scientific publications, either (less than 0.9% 
overall). To the extent that they do occur, however, it is ‘understanding’ again that occurs most 
frequently overall, followed by ‘knowledge’, and then ‘truth’. This time, the only exception is 
Linguistics, where ‘knowledge’ still occurs more frequently than ‘understanding’ in the context 
of talk about goals, as in the context of talk about aims. Unlike the context of aim talk, 
‘understanding’ now occurs more frequently than ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ in the context of goal 
talk in Anthropology, Geography, Geology, Sociology, and Zoology. 
 
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the proportions of scientific 
publications that contain the terms for the basic units of progress in the context of (i.e., within ten 
words of) the progress term ‘goal’ across the subjects tested in this study. First, there was a 
significant difference between the proportion of (“goal knowledge”~10) publications (M = 
0.001, SD = 0.001, N = 15) and (“goal truth”~10) publications (M = 0.0003, SD = 0.0004, N = 
15), t(16) = -2.56, p < 0.02, two-tailed. Second, there was a significant difference between the 
proportion of (“goal understanding”~10) publications (M = 0.002, SD = 0.001, N = 15) and 
(“goal truth”~10) publications (M = 0.0003, SD = 0.0004, N = 15), t(16) = -3.41, p < 0.00, two-
tailed. Finally, there was no significant difference between the proportion of (“goal 
knowledge”~10) publications (M = 0.001, SD = 0.001, N = 15) and (“goal understanding”~10) 
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publications (M = 0.002, SD = 0.001, N = 15), t(28) = -0.78, p < 0.44, two-tailed. These results 
suggest that there is significantly more talk about the goal of scientific research in terms of 
knowledge than in terms of truth, and there is also significantly more talk about the goal of 
scientific research in terms of understanding than in terms of truth, but there isn’t significantly 
more talk about the goal of scientific research in terms of understanding than in terms of 
knowledge. 
 
In order to make sure that the text-mining methodology described in Section 2 returns 
genuine instances of the terms for basic units of progress in the context of talk about the goals of 
scientific research, one result from the life sciences, one result from the physical sciences, one 
result from the social sciences, and one result from the formal sciences were selected at random 
(emphasis added): 
 
1. Life Sciences: “With continually advancing technologies and increasingly sophisticated 
bioinformatics tools at our disposal, data production capacity will only increase and, 
without care, we risk losing sight of the primary goal - to advance knowledge rather than 
generate data” (Hall 2006, p. 465). 
2. Physical Sciences: “Our Palaeogene sediment studies will address these questions that are 
related to our primary science goal of understanding subduction initiation...” (Sutherland 
2017, p. 168). 
3. Social Sciences: “We provide the first causal estimate of the impact of attending SEED 
schools on academic achievement, with the goal of understanding whether changing a 
student’s environment is an effective strategy to increase achievement among the poor” 
(Curto and Fryer Jr. 2014, p. 65). 
4. Formal Sciences: “Our goal is to establish the truth of this result for a field of arbitrary 
characteristic” (Lichtman 1981, p. 188). 
 
In each of these examples, practicing scientists talk about the goals of their research in terms of 
understanding, knowledge, or truth. Statistically speaking, however, there is no significant 
difference between talk of the goal of scientific research in terms of increasing understanding 
than talk of the goal of scientific research in terms of advancing knowledge. Both talk of the goal 
of scientific research in terms of knowledge and talk of the goal of scientific research in terms of 
understanding, however, are significantly more frequent than talk of the goal of scientific 
research in terms of truth. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
As discussed in Section 2, this corpus-based study was designed to test philosophical views of 
scientific progress—namely, the semantic account (i.e., scientific progress in terms of truth), the 
epistemic account (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account (i.e., 
scientific progress in terms of understanding)—against scientific practice. For, on the 
assumption that we can learn from scientific practices, specifically, from what scientists say and 
do in their published works, each of these philosophical accounts of scientific progress has 
empirical consequences that can be tested against scientific practice. More specifically: 
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● On the semantic account, which defines scientific progress in terms of truth, we would 
expect to find that practicing scientists talk about scientific progress in terms of truth 
more than knowledge or understanding in scientific publications. 
● On the epistemic account, which defines scientific progress in terms of knowledge, we 
would expect to find that practicing scientists talk about scientific progress in terms of 
knowledge more than truth or understanding in scientific publications. 
● On the noetic account, which defines scientific progress in terms of understanding, we 
would expect to find that practicing scientists talk about scientific progress in terms of 
understanding more than knowledge or truth in scientific publications. 
 
Overall, the results of this study suggest that the terms for the basic units of progress, namely, 
‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘understanding’, do not occur all that frequently in scientific 
publications (less than 0.4% in the context of talk about the aims of scientific research and less 
than 0.9% in the context of talk about the goals of scientific research). To the extent that they do 
occur, however, the progress terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ occur significantly more 
frequently than the progress term ‘truth’ in the context of talk about scientific aims or goals, as 
the results of independent-samples t-tests show. 
 
These results can be construed as providing some empirical support to the epistemic and 
the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, provided that the 
methodological assumptions of these empirical study are acceptable (see Section 2). For, as we 
would expect if the epistemic account of scientific progress were true, the results suggest that 
talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in terms of knowledge is significantly more 
frequent than talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in terms of truth in scientific 
publications. Likewise, as we would expect if the noetic account of scientific progress were true, 
the results suggest that talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in terms of 
understanding is significantly more frequent than talk about the aims or goals of scientific 
research in terms of truth in scientific publications. Since the results of independent-samples t-
tests do not point to any significant differences between the frequency with which practicing 
scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims or goals 
of scientific research in their published works, these results do not lend any empirical support to 
the epistemic account over the noetic account or to the noetic account over the epistemic 
account. For this reason, further studies are needed in order to determine which of these two 
philosophical accounts of scientific progress best captures “actual scientific practice, scientific 
activity” (van Fraassen 1994, p. 184). 
 
As discussed in Section 2, like the results of other empirical studies, the results of this 
corpus-based study are not to be interpreted as conclusive evidence for or against any 
philosophical accounts of scientific progress. Rather, they are supposed to contribute to our 
understanding of scientific progress in scientific practice. Some philosophers of science, who 
prefer rational reconstructions of science (Lakatos 1971, pp. 91-136),9 as opposed to empirical 
studies of scientific practices, might object that we do not gain much by way of understanding 
the nature of science when we study scientific practices, i.e., what practicing scientists say and 
 
9 According to Machery (2016, p. 480), “Rational reconstructions reconstruct the way scientists use particular 
concepts,” such as scientific progress. 
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do, empirically.10 This is a methodological debate about how to do philosophy of science that is 
beyond the scope of this paper. For the purposes of this quantitative, corpus-based study, I take it 
as a methodological assumption that we can gain valuable insights about science from a 
systematic study of what practicing scientists say and do, specifically, what they say and do in 
their scholarly publications. For, as van Fraassen (1994, p. 184) puts it, “Any philosophical view 
of science is to be held accountable to actual scientific practice, scientific activity.” Accordingly, 
philosophical views of scientific progress are be held accountable to actual scientific practice, 
scientific activity. After all, what practicing scientists say and do in their research articles in 
particular seems to fall under “actual scientific practice” or “scientific activity” because what 
scientists say and do in general falls under “actual scientific practice” or “scientific activity.” As 
Rouse (2007, p. 84) puts it, “A philosophy of scientific practices [...] aims to avoid unwarranted 
philosophical impositions upon science, by attending more closely to what scientists say and do” 
(emphasis added). Consequently, philosophical views of scientific progress can (and perhaps 
should) be held accountable to what practicing scientists say and do in their research articles. The 
aim of this study has been to shed light on what practicing scientists say and do in their research 
articles as far as scientific progress is concerned. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in 
philosophy of science by taking an empirical approach. By employing the methods of data 
science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress were 
tested against scientific practice: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific 
progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in 
terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in 
terms of understanding). Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some 
empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific 
progress, for they suggest that scientists use the progress terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ 
significantly more often than the progress term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims or goals of 
scientific research in their published works. But the results of this study do not favor the 
epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant 
differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their 
published works. The philosophical significance of these findings consists in providing empirical 
evidence against which to test one’s philosophical accounts of scientific progress, if one is so 
inclined. For, as Machery (2016, p. 480) puts it, “if we can show experimentally that a candidate 
rational reconstruction [or philosophical account] of a given concept x has nothing or little to do 
with scientists’ unreconstructed use of x, then this gives us a strong reason to assume that the 
reconstruction is erroneous.” 
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